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CASE NOTE

“KNOCK, LISTEN, THEN BREAK THE DOOR DOWN”?
THE POLICE-CREATED EXIGENCY DOCTRINE AFTER
KENTUCKY v. KING

RACHEL LEVICK†
1

In an effort to curtail the excesses of the general warrant and to
2
protect Americans and their private property, the authors of the Bill
of Rights in the Fourth Amendment conditioned the issuance of war3
rants on the presence of probable cause. Though this language has
been construed to require such a warrant for most searches of the
4
home, the Supreme Court has identified several exceptions to this
rule, including the “exigent circumstances” exception. Where “the
exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under
5
the Fourth Amendment,” a warrantless search is constitutional. In an
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assistance during the writing process.
1
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) (“[I]ndiscriminate searches and
seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants’ were the immediate evils
that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.”).
2
See id. at 585 (“The simple language of the Amendment applies equally to seizures
of persons and to seizures of property.”).
3
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4
See e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978)(“[W]arrents are generally
required to search a person’s home or his person . . . .”).
5
Id. at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has identified
several such exigencies, including the need to provide emergency medical aid, the “hot
pursuit” of a fleeing suspect, and the prevention of imminent destruction of evidence.
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011).

(1)
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effort to clarify the boundaries of the exigent circumstances exception
and to protect Fourth Amendment interests, several federal courts of
appeals have held that the police cannot create an exigency and sub6
sequently use it to justify a warrantless entry. In order to determine if
a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred in such a case, these
7
courts have relied on a variety of tests.
In Kentucky v. King, the Supreme Court sought to reconcile the
8
“welter of tests” articulated by the lower courts and to craft a uniform
9
approach to police-created exigencies. The Court addressed the question of whether the exigent circumstances exception applies “when
police, by knocking on the door of a residence and announcing their
10
presence, cause the occupants to attempt to destroy evidence.” Reversing the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the Supreme Court found
that where “the police d[o] not create the exigency by engaging or
threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth
Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence
11
is reasonable and thus allowed.”
This ruling aligns with both the Court’s precedent and the motivations underlying the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, the Court’s
6

See United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 371 (3d Cir. 2006) (declaring a warrantless search invalid because the arresting officers impermissibly created exigency in entering the defendant’s hotel room); United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 591 (5th Cir.
2004) (permitting a warrantless search where there was no evidence that the officers
intentionally created the exigency); United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1254 (3d
Cir. 1992) (recognizing that police may not create an exigency to justify a forced warrantless entry); United States v. Duchi, 906 F.2d 1278, 1284 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding
that an exigency that supports warrantless entry “cannot be created by police officers”); United States v. Timberlake, 896 F.2d 592, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (explaining that
police may not intentionally create an exigency to justify a warrantless entry into a private dwelling); United States v. Rengifo, 858 F.2d 800, 804 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[E]xigent
circumstances do not excuse the failure to secure a warrant when those circumstances
are created by government officials . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United
States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 950 (5th Cir. 1983) (“The agents cannot justify their
search on the basis of exigent circumstances of their own making.”).
7
See, e.g., United States v. Mowatt, 513 F.3d 395, 402-03 (4th Cir. 2008) (using a
reasonable foreseeability test); United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 563, 565 (6th Cir.
2005) (endorsing a probable cause and time to secure a warrant test); Gould, 364 F.3d
at 591 (relying on a standard or good investigative tactics test); King v. Commonwealth,
302 S.W.3d 649, 656 (Ky. 2010) (adopting a bad faith intent test).
8
131 S. Ct. 1849, 1857 (2011).
9
See id. at 1858-63 (considering alternate proposals and selecting a rule that was
consistent with precedent and provided protection for Fourth Amendment rights).
10
Id. at 1854.
11
Id. at 1858.
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test leaves some important questions unanswered, and the lower courts
applying King will be forced to further develop the exigency exception
to ensure that citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights are protected.
I. KENTUCKY V. K ING: FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts of King illustrate the challenges faced by law enforcement officials and the threats posed to police suspects’ Fourth
Amendment rights. On the night in question, Officer Gibbons, an undercover officer in Lexington, Kentucky, executed a controlled buy of
12
crack cocaine. After the exchange, Officer Gibbons instructed several
officers to pursue the suspect into the breezeway of a nearby apart13
ment building. Upon entering the breezeway, the responding officers
detected a strong odor of burnt marijuana and heard a door shut
14
somewhere in the breezeway. The officers concluded that the odor
was emanating from the back left apartment. Although Officer Gibbons
radioed that he witnessed the suspect enter the back right apartment,
the pursuing officers did not hear Officer Gibbons as they had already
15
exited their vehicles.
The officers then knocked on the back left door “as loud as [they]
could” and announced “[t]his is the police,” or “[p]olice, police, po16
lice.” After knocking on the door, the officers heard objects being
17
moved somewhere inside the apartment. Fearful that drug-related
evidence was going to be destroyed, the officers shouted that they
18
“were going to make entry inside the apartment.” One of these officers, Officer Cobb then kicked the door open and entered the back left
19
apartment. The police detained the three occupants of the apartment, including King, and although the original suspect had entered a
different apartment, they nonetheless discovered and confiscated co20
caine, cash, and drug paraphernalia lying in plain view.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Id. at 1854.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1854.
Id.
Id.
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At trial, King moved to suppress the evidence obtained during this
21
warrantless search. The state trial court denied his motion, reasoning
that the police entry was justified by the exigent circumstances of the
22
imminent destruction of evidence. King then entered a conditional
guilty plea for trafficking in a controlled substance and other
23
crimes. He was sentenced to eleven years in prison, and the Kentucky
24
Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, determining that the officers had impermissibly created the exigent circumstances which led
25
to the warrantless search and ultimately to King’s conviction. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court set forth a two-part test based on
bad faith and reasonable foreseeability for identifying a police-created
26
exigency. Applying the test to King’s case, the Kentucky Supreme
Court found that, though there was no evidence of bad faith, the police could have reasonably foreseen that their actions would spur the
defendants to destroy evidence, and therefore, that the police search
27
violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court granted King’s motion
28
to suppress and vacated his conviction.
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
29

The United States Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the eightJustice majority, Justice Alito rejected the Kentucky Supreme Court’s
reasoning and adopted the Court’s preferred rule, stating that police
officers cannot rely on the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement when they created the exigency by “engaging
or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth
21

Id. at 1855.
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649, 657 (Ky. 2010).
26
See id. at 656. The court first held that police could not “deliberately create[] the
exigent circumstances with the bad faith intent to avoid the warrant requirement.” Id.
(quoting United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 590 (5th Cir. 2004)). The court then
explained that even absent bad faith, police may not rely on exigent circumstances if
it “was reasonably foreseeable that the investigative tactics employed by the police
would create the exigent circumstances.” Id. (quoting Mann v. State, 161 S.W.3d
826, 834 (Ark. 2004)).
27
See King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d at 656-57.
28
Id. at 657.
29
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1864.
22

Levick.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

9/20/2012 1:19 PM

“Knock, Listen, Then Break the Door Down”?
30

5
31

Amendment.” The Court grounded its test in reasonableness, the
32
“touchstone of the Fourth Amendment,” and two analogous areas of
Fourth Amendment law that permit warrantless searches—the plain
33
34
view exception and consent-based encounters.
The Court then discussed and rejected four other tests developed
35
by the lower courts. First, the Court rejected the Kentucky Supreme
Court’s “bad faith” test—which asks whether an officer attempted to
36
circumvent the warrant requirement —stating that the Court had re37
peatedly declined to adopt tests based on subjective intent. The
Court similarly refused to implement a reasonable foreseeability test,
which focuses on whether it was reasonably foreseeable that an

30

Id. at 1858.
Id. (“[W]arrantless searches are allowed when the circumstances make it reasonable, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to dispense with the warrant requirement. Therefore, . . . the exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search
when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable in the same sense.”).
32
Id. at 1856 (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).
33
See id. at 1858 (“[W]e have held that law enforcement officers may seize evidence
in plain view, provided that they have not violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving
at the spot from which the observation of the evidence is made.”).
34
See id. (“[O]fficers may seek consent-based encounters if they are lawfully present
in the place where the consensual encounter occurs.”). These analogies have been
criticized as irrelevant to the facts of King and ignorant of the special protection afforded to homes under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE § 6.5 (rev. 4th ed. Supp. 2011) (“[N]either [analogy] is particularly relevant to
. . . King, where the logical starting point is that homes are entitled to ‘special protection . . . .’” (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006))); id. (explaining
that when dealing with home searches, the Court practices a “rather strict application
of the fundamental rule that ‘whenever practical [sic], [the police must] obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedures.’”
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968))). However, these criticisms ignore the
purpose for which the exigent circumstances exception itself was created: in certain
instances, where an emergency has presented itself, a warrantless search of a home may
be “objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,” irrespective of the special
protections afforded to the home. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978). The
Court’s analogies demonstrate the validity of the officer’s actions prior to the alleged
Fourth Amendment violation and illustrate that the Court’s rule is consistent with its
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
35
See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1859-1861.
36
Id. at 1859.
37
See id. (explaining that an officer’s motives never invalidate an otherwise valid
search and citing precedent to that effect). Supreme Court precedent supports the
rejection of the bad faith test. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006)
(“An action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual
officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978))).
31
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officer’s action would create an exigency, such as the imminent de38
struction of evidence. The Court found this test unpredictable and
39
unclear, explaining that it would be difficult to apply, given that law
enforcement officers must make split-second decisions in the field and
judges would be forced to determine reasonableness “based on what the
40
officers knew at the time.”
The Court also dismissed a test that asks whether police engaged
in a warrantless search despite having probable cause and time to se41
cure a warrant. The Court found that this test “unjustifiably interferes
with legitimate law enforcement strategies,” because “law enforcement
officers are under no constitutional duty to halt a criminal investigation the moment they have minimum evidence to establish probable
42
cause.” Finally, the Court rejected a test that considers whether police
had engaged in standard or good investigative tactics, on the ground
that such an inquiry “fails to provide clear guidance for law enforcement officers and authorizes courts to make judgments on matters
that are the province of those who are responsible for federal and state
43
law enforcement agencies.”
The Court then applied its preferred standard to the facts of the
case, and finding no Fourth Amendment violation, reversed the Ken44
tucky Supreme Court’s suppression of the evidence. The Court concluded that the officers’ actions, including banging on the door and
announcing their presence, were “entirely consistent with the Fourth
Amendment,” and found “no other evidence that might show that the
45
officers either violated the Fourth Amendment or threatened to do so.”
III. JUSTICE GINSBURG’S DISSENT: “KNOCK, LISTEN, THEN BREAK THE
DOOR DOWN”
Justice Ginsburg dissented from the majority, arguing that police
officers would manipulate this new standard in an attempt to circum46
vent the warrant requirement. In her view, law enforcement officers
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1859-60.
Id.
Id. at 1860.
Id.
Id. at 1860-61 (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966)).
Id. at 1861.
Id. at 1863.
Id.
See id. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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could “now knock, listen, then break the door down, nevermind that
47
they had ample time to obtain a warrant.” The Court’s new test would
not only permit but also incentivize police officers to go door-to-door,
pounding loudly and announcing their presence, and “on hearing
sounds indicative of things moving, forcibly enter and search for evi48
dence of unlawful activity.”
Justice Ginsburg advocated for the probable cause and time to
secure a warrant test instead, arguing that the majority’s test “arms the
police with a way routinely to dishonor the Fourth Amendment’s
49
warrant requirement in drug cases.” Under Justice Ginsburg’s
alternative rule, the exigencies “must exist . . . when the police come
on the scene, not subsequent to their arrival, prompted by their own
50
conduct.” Because the police in King had ample time to secure a warrant yet failed to do so, Justice Ginsburg would have found a
51
Fourth Amendment violation.
Justice Ginsburg’s proposed rule is appealing because it recognizes
the possibility of police abuse or manipulation in justifying intrusions
into private homes, the “chief evil against which . . . the Fourth
52
Amendment is directed.” However, Justice Ginsburg failed to adequately respond to the majority’s concern that her rule would limit
police autonomy and effectiveness. As the majority pointed out, good
53
legal reasons exist for rejecting Justice Ginsburg’s preferred test. In
addition, members of the Court asked questions at oral argument that
54
echoed Justice Ginsburg’s concerns, and the Court apparently found
47

Id.
Id. at 1865.
49
Id. at 1864.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1866 (claiming that “securing a warrant was entirely feasible in this case”).
52
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (quoting United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
53
See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1860-61 (stating that Justice Ginsburg’s test unreasonably
interferes with law enforcement tactics).
54
See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849
(2011) (No. 09-1272) (Sotomayor, J.) (“[H]ow does this holding by us not become a
simple warrantless entry in any drug case?”); id. at 19 (Sotomayor, J.) (“[D]oes a ruling
in this case that any lawful conduct by the police mean that the police knock, somebody gets up on the other side and . . . closes a door in the back, and police say, ‘In my
experience it’s . . . consistent with the destruction of property . . . .’”); id. at 24 (Breyer,
J.) (“[W]hat we’re trying to rule out is . . . they get this bright idea, the police: We’ll go
knock at every door.”); id. at 52 (Kagan, J.) ( “[T]he concern here is that your test is
going to enable the police to penetrate the home . . . without a warrant . . . in a very
wide variety of cases, that all police really have to say is: We saw pot, we heard noise.”).
48

Levick.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra

8

9/20/2012 1:19 PM

[Vol. 161: 1

that the risk of police abuse were not sufficient to reject the test the
Court ultimately adopted.
Despite the Court’s rejection of Justice Ginsburg’s test, there are
strong arguments in its favor. First, police can, in Justice Ginsburg’s
view of the King doctrine, simply “knock, listen, then break the door
55
down.” King has reduced the circumstances in which warrantless
searches will result in the suppression of evidence, and this allows—or
perhaps, encourages—police to test the limits of the Fourth Amendment more frequently which in turn will increase the number of unlawful invasions by police Those who are victims of these type of
Fourth Amendment violations are left in a “remedial gap” in which
56
they can “recover from neither the officer nor the government.” Alternatively, defendants guilty of criminal conduct sometimes receive a
57
“get-out-of-jail-free” card in the form of the suppression remedy. In
other words, under the current Fourth Amendment remedial scheme,
“[c]riminals go free, while honest citizens are intruded upon in outra58
geous ways with little or no real remedy.”
Whether Justice Ginsburg’s prediction of increased police misconduct will materialize depends on how the Supreme Court and lower
courts construe the King doctrine in response to two issues: “exactly
how . . . the line [is] to be drawn between permissible and impermissible police conduct potentially creating exigent circumstances,” and
“assuming permissible conduct, how convincing must the evidence be
that exigent circumstances, in the form of a risk of loss of evidence,
59
are present.” If the lower courts continue to effectively develop the
60
police created exigency doctrine by correctly applying the King rule,
Justice Ginsburg’s fears will likely never be realized.
IV. APPLYING KING: ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
The Supreme Court chose the best test among those developed by
lower courts. While it was the narrowest of the possibilities available to

55

King, 131 S. Ct. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 812 (1994).
57
See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595 (2006) (explaining the high costs
of the exclusionary rule).
58
Amar, supra note 56, at 758.
59
LAFAVE, supra note 34, at § 6.5
60
See cases cited infra notes 62-63, 67-68 75-77.
56
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61

the Court, the lower courts have had little difficulty utilizing the
Court’s test in factual circumstances similar to those of King, where
police anticipated the imminent destruction of evidence and entered a
62
residence without a warrant, and have even applied the rule to dissimilar fact patterns. For example, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, following King’s reasoning, found exigency based on officer safety,
analogizing a threat to officer safety to the risk of the destruction of
63
evidence in King. Most importantly, the lower courts have applied
King’s reasoning without falling into the traps envisioned by Justice
64
Ginsburg and other critics.

61

LAFAVE, supra note 34 (“The Supreme Court . . . adopt[ed] from the ‘welter of
tests’ devised by lower courts the one providing by far the narrowest exception to the
exigent circumstances rule . . . .”).
62
See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 443 F. App’x 806, 808 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (finding no police-created exigency where the defendant saw and fled from police,
the defendant agreed to exit the apartment but failed to do so, and police “believed
immediate entry was necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence”); United States
v. Hoskins, No. 10-20677, 2011 WL 4062307, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2011) (finding
no police-created exigency where drug trafficker was using a cell phone at time of arrest, and detectives feared he “was arranging for an associate to destroy evidence at his
residence before a search warrant could be obtained”); United States v. Franklin, No.
5:11-CR-42-KKC, 2011 WL 5827605, at *3-4 (E.D. Ky. Aug 31, 2011) (finding no policecreated exigency where police entered defendant’s backyard without a warrant after
tracking him for more than an hour); Fulton v. State, No. 27A02-1101-CR-132, 2011 WL
3847082, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2011) (unpublished table decision) (finding no
police-created exigency where police sought a “knock-and-talk” to ascertain the whereabouts of a suspect but heard increased commotion inside the apartment and someone
yell to “flush” something); State v. Wood, No. COA10-372, 2011 WL 3891357, at *2-5
(N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2011) (unpublished table decision) (holding that there was no
police-created exigency where police received tip that defendant was dealing drugs at a
hotel, the defendant’s girlfriend “began to come unraveled and physically shaken”
when speaking with police, and police heard a door slam when approaching
defendant’s hotel room).
63
See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 453 F. App’x 401, 403-04 (4th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (finding no constitutional violation where police looked through a broken
window and observed a suspect with cocaine base as well as a gun, and the suspect
pointed the firearm toward the door on which police had knocked); United States v.
Montanya, 425 F. App’x 392, 393 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (finding no constitutional violation when police officers searched a house without a warrant after observing
a known narcotics trafficker engage in an apparent drug deal and then throw a weapon
under the car when they approached him); see also People v. Torrez, No. H036145,
2011 WL 3654453, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2011) (finding no police-created exigency where police were responding to a domestic violence call, heard loud noises
inside the house, and a male spoke to police through the door but
refused them entry).
64
See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
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A. Does King Tempt Courts to Excuse Unconstitutional Conduct?
One critic of King has expressed concern that a two-step analysis—
in which the reviewing court first determines whether an exigency existed, and then decides whether the police inappropriately created
some or all of that exigency—will lead judges to excuse police miscon65
duct. Since a judge will have already affirmed that an exigency existed, the reasoning goes, the judge may be hesitant to invalidate the
search on the ground that police conduct may have contributed to
66
that exigency. But the lower court decisions in the wake of King have
not inappropriately excused police misconduct. In fact, courts have
not hesitated to suppress evidence gathered following a police-created
67
exigency. For example, the Arizona Court of Appeals suppressed the
fruits of a warrantless search where, “[u]nlike the circumstances in
King, in which the officers testified that . . . they could hear people
moving things within the apartment,” there was no evidence before
the court that “the officers heard any noise or made any other observa68
tions suggesting the imminent destruction of evidence.” Accordingly,
because the occupant of the premises chose not to answer the door
but officers nevertheless threatened to enter, the court found that the
officer’s threat was “not reasonable conduct under the Fourth
69
Amendment and was therefore unlawful.” As a result, the court sup70
pressed the evidence gathered through the unconstitutional search.

65

See The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Leading Cases, 125 HARV. L. REV. 211, 220
(2011) (arguing that a one-step test avoids the structural bias against criminal defendants that a two-step test would engender).
66
Id.
67
See, e.g., United States v. Fuentes, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1153-54 (D. Or. 2011)
(finding that the police-created exigency was a Fourth Amendment violation where the
officer peered through a window without a “specific, particularized basis for believing
that a crime had been committed, that his safety was threatened, or that evidence was
being destroyed,” and only on the basis of what he saw, executed a search); State v.
Walker, No. A-4672-08T1, 2011 WL 2535295, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 28,
2011) (per curiam) (finding police-created exigency where defendant opened his door
while smoking a marijuana cigarette, and upon seeing a badge hanging around the
officer’s neck, ran into his apartment, prompting police to follow). Cf. State v. Young,
2d Dist. No. 24537, 2011-Ohio-4875, ¶ 52 (Froelich, J., dissenting) (“[T]here was no
King justification to look for drugs or the destruction of evidence. In this case, a search
(albeit designated as a sweep) has been bootstrapped from a mother’s calling the police
with a complaint that her son continues to argue with her and keeps her up all night.”).
68
State v. Aguilar, 267 P.3d 1193, 1196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).
69
Id. at 1197.
70
Id.
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This decision is consistent with King’s recognition that occupants
have no obligation to open the door to police who request entry with71
out a warrant. Furthermore, decisions such as this one protect the
rights of citizens against the type of unlawful home entry Justice Ginsburg feared. To avoid the risk that police will “knock, listen, then
72
break the door down,” citizens in their homes need only to “stand
73
on their constitutional rights” and decline to respond to police
questions or requests for entry.
Of course, there is a risk that an overly zealous police officer could
interpret any noise emanating from a targeted residence—including
those caused by everyday activities—as indicative of an exigency. However, discerning whether sounds are consistent with an exigency is a
74
fact-bound inquiry that is the province of the trial court. When police
violate Fourth Amendment rights on the basis of pseudo-exigencies,
courts applying King have been, and must continue to be, swift to
invalidate the search. Vigilance in this regard is a necessary corollary
to the permissiveness of the King rule, and provides an answer to
Justice Ginsburg’s concerns.
Like the Arizona Court of Appeals, other courts have rejected warrantless entries where only a possible exigency existed. For example, the
Iowa Supreme Court invalidated a warrantless search following the
arrest of a drug trafficking suspect because “the record [did] not support an inference that drugs were likely to be destroyed . . . . [h]ence,
there was no reasonable fear that evidence would be lost during the
75
time necessary to obtain a warrant.” Though the officer claimed he
thought someone else in the apartment might destroy evidence, the
court rejected this justification in the absence of any supporting evi76
dence. These decisions, and others like them, show that lower courts

71

Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011) (“[W]hether the person who
knocks on the door and requests the opportunity to speak is a police officer or a private
citizen, the occupant has no obligation to open the door or to speak.”).
72
Id. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
73
Id. at 1862 (majority opinion).
74
See id. at 1863 (“Any question about whether an exigency actually existed is better
addressed by the Kentucky Supreme Court on remand.”).
75
State v. Watts, 801 N.W.2d 845, 851-52 (Iowa 2011) (citing King, 131 S. Ct. at 1854).
76
See id. at 851 (reasoning that “nothing indicated another individual might be potentially inside the apartment”). The court nevertheless affirmed the defendant’s
convictions because the evidence was procured during a later search pursuant to a
valid warrant. Id. at 856.
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applying King are willing to invalidate improper entries on a case-bycase basis if the facts show that police committed misconduct.
It is true that a few lower courts have authored questionable King
analyses and have justified possible police exploitation. In United States
v. Alba, police entered a residence pursuant to a valid warrant, but realized after entry that the warrant listed, and they had entered, the
77
incorrect residence. After receiving directions to the correct house
78
from another agent, the police entered without a warrant, “based on
the need to protect the agents from persons inside the residence, the
risk of destruction of evidence inside the house, and the belief that the
occupants of [the defendant’s] residence were aware of the agents’
79
presence.” The Fifth Circuit found that the officers did not engage or
threaten to engage in conduct that violated the Fourth Amendment by
entering the second residence, even though the warrant
80
listed the first residence.
The Fifth Circuit’s analysis ignores the obvious fact that the police
could have avoided risks to officer safety and the possible destruction
of evidence by not entering the incorrect house. Because the Supreme
Court published King after the trial proceedings ended, the defendant
did not raise the manufactured-exigency argument in his motion to
81
suppress at trial. This timing may have affected the Fifth Circuit’s decision, as it reviewed the district court’s denial of his motion under the
82
more lenient plain error standard instead of under the de novo standard.
Despite these mitigating circumstances, decisions like Alba may
encourage exploitative police work and could allow for ex post facto
83
justifications of unlawful entries based on police or magistrate error.
77

Brief for the United States of America at 4-6, United States v. Alba, 439 F. App’x
291 (5th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-51019) (describing how investigators confused the addresses).
78
Id. at 6.
79
United States v. Alba, 439 F. App’x 291, 293 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
80
Id.
81
See id.
82
Id. (“In considering a ruling on a motion to suppress . . . we review a district
court's conclusions on Fourth Amendment issues de novo and its factual findings for
clear error. . . . However, because Alba did not raise his manufactured-exigency argument in his motion to suppress, that issue is reviewed for plain error.” (citations omitted)).
83
For a second example of questionable application of the King doctrine, see United States v. Hall, No. 11-60169-CR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133522, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Nov.
16, 2011) (finding no police-created exigency where police covered the peep hole of
the defendant’s door as they knocked, and did not identify themselves, despite defendant’s contention that this action “made it more likely that [he] would approach the
door armed based on a fear that robbers were at the door”).
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Fortunately, such questionable applications of the King rule have been
few and far between.
B. Is King Confusing or Open to Abuse?
Others have criticized the King decision as confusing or as enabling law enforcement to circumvent the warrant requirement. This
first criticism is somewhat valid, insofar as both courts and law en84
forcement may struggle to apply the King rule to new facts. However,
the remaining critics misunderstand or oversimplify the Court’s holding.
For example, King’s detractors have characterized the decision as
“holding that in certain circumstances police may provoke exigent cir85
cumstances to justify a warrantless search.” But this criticism misinterprets King: provoking an exigency is akin to creating the exigency,
both of which the Fourth Amendment already proscribes. In reality, to
intentionally provoke exigent circumstances, the police would have to
demand entry or feign the existence of a warrant and threaten entry,
giving the residents inside reason to believe entry was imminent and
inciting them to attempt to destroy evidence. Such actions are viola86
tions of the Fourth Amendment and are explicitly prohibited by King.
Other critics have read King to imply that when citizens refuse to
respond to police requests for warrantless searches, they risk creating a
King- supported exigency by their non-responsiveness:
The sound of people moving around might indicate that they are about
to destroy evidence but it also might mean that they are simply ignoring
the police and going about their business. Moreover, had they remained
perfectly still, the police might have inferred that they were steeling
themselves to attack. This leaves answering the door as the only option

84

See Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing
Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1, 38 (2011) (“[P]olice can only rely
on exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search so long as they did not ‘violate
or threaten to violate the Fourth Amendment prior to the exigency.’ To call this thicket
a bright-line rule governing the entry of a home is an insult to lines (or brightness).”
(quoting Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1863 (2011))).
85
Josh Bowers, Fundamental Fairness and the Path from Santobello to Padilla: A Response to Professor Bibas, 2 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 52, 56 n.26 (2011) (emphasis added).
86
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1863 (2011) (reasoning that police would violate the Fourth Amendment “by announcing that they would break down the door if
the occupants did not open the door voluntarily”).
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that does not create an exigency, but the Court went out of its way
87
in King to say that one has a [sic] every right not to answer.

However, King does not foreclose the option to ignore police. In
fact, the Court explicitly recognized that, upon a request for entry to a
home, “whether the person who knocks . . . is a police officer or a private citizen, the occupant has no obligation to open the door or to
88
speak.” Choosing not to speak gives no indication of imminent destruction of evidence and does not create sufficient exigency for police to enter a private residence without a warrant.
King might pose a risk to citizens who, in response to a police
knock, choose to move around in their home but do not destroy evidence. Police may conflate the sounds of normal movement with an
89
attempt to destroy evidence, as may have occurred in King itself.
However, the veracity of officers’ beliefs that sounds are consistent
with the destruction of evidence is a factual matter to be determined
by the trial court, and does not fall under the purview of the Supreme
90
Court rule. In fact, on remand from the Supreme Court decision, the
Kentucky Supreme Court determined that the sounds relied on by the
officers in King to justify their entry “were indistinguishable from ordinary household sounds, and were consistent with the natural and rea91
sonable result of a knock on the door.” The court vacated King’s
conviction on the grounds that the Commonwealth had failed to
“show something more than a possibility that evidence [was] being
92
destroyed.” The Kentucky Supreme Court’s subsequent decision
demonstrates that King provides a remedy when police enter a

87

Michael J. Z. Mannheimer, Thoughts on Kentucky v. King, PRAWFSBLAWG
(May 17, 2011, 2:31 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/05/
thoughts-on-kentucky-v-king.html.
88
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862 (emphasis added).
89
Id. (recognizing that the Kentucky Supreme Court had expressed doubt “as to
whether the sound of persons moving [inside the apartment] was sufficient to establish
that evidence was being destroyed” (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649,
655 (Ky. 2010)) (alterations in original)).
90
See id. at 1864 (remanding for further proceedings as to whether an exigency existed to justify a warrantless police search); see also Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638
(2002) (per curiam) (remanding for proceedings to determine whether exigent circumstances were present).
91
King v. Commonwealth, No. 2008-SC-000274-DG, 2012 WL 1450081, at *3
(Ky. Apr. 26, 2012).
92
Id.
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residence based on the mistaken and unreasonable interpretation of
everyday noises as sounds indicating the destruction of evidence.
C. Should King Have Adopted Another Test Altogether?
Rather than critiquing the risks of confusion or exploitation created
by the King decision, other critics have called for a different test altogether. Lewis Katz argues that “[p]olice could have avoided the exigency by not knocking on the door, concealing their presence while
they called for a warrant” and that the exigency, therefore, “was entirely police made and calls into question the entire doctrine of police93
created exigency.” In raising such a concern, Katz and other commentators push for the adoption of the probable cause and time to
94
95
secure a warrant test, which the King Court explicitly rejected. While
securing a warrant may be preferable in some circumstances, requiring
police to clear this hurdle in every circumstance unnecessarily restricts
the options available to law enforcement and may result in the inter96
ruption of police investigations when immediate action is necessary.
In addition, the question of whether police possessed time to secure a
warrant is subjective and fact-intensive; police, magistrates, and judges
adjudicating claims may offer diverging interpretations of the amount
97
of time required. Further, these critics fail to respond to the Court’s
reasons for rejecting the probable cause and time to secure a warrant test
in the first place, and their criticism of the King test is unpersuasive.
Finally, one commentator has called for a new one-step doctrine,
rejecting both the Court’s chosen test and those articulated by the
93

LEWIS R. KATZ, OHIO ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.5 (2012). See also King,
131 S. Ct. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for creating a rule
whereby police may gain entry premised on an exigency, “nevermind that they had
ample time to obtain a warrant”).
94
See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 34, at § 6.5 (“The King Court rejects [the probable
cause rule] on the ground that there may be good reasons for the police to opt instead
for contact with the occupants of the suspect premises, but some of the reasons given
by the Court seem rather thin.”).
95
See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1860 (arguing that “[t]his approach unjustifiably interferes
with legitimate law enforcement strategies”).
96
See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966) (“Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause . . . .”).
97
In rejecting the reasonableness test, the Court recognized that such a test would
require “quantify[ing] the degree of predictability that must be reached before the
police-created exigency doctrine comes into play,” and described the difficulties inherent in making such a calculus. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1859-60.
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98

lower courts. This critic has argued that since “the police-created exigency doctrine is just another variable in the holistic calculus of
99
whether exigent circumstances existed,” the Court should have “included police causation as part of its [holistic] exigent circumstances
inquiry, [which] could have prevented manipulation of the rule,
avoided interference with law enforcement, protected the privacy of
100
the home, and ensured a more neutral analysis.”
But, as the author of this critique recognizes, the exigent circumstances calculus is already fact-intensive and requires a nuanced, holistic
101
inquiry. Accordingly, to add another factor to the analysis, especially
one as outcome-determinative as whether the police impermissibly
created the exigency, would only serve to further complicate the
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Ultimately, the reasonable time to secure a warrant test, along with
the other tests examined and rejected by the Court, provide no more
guidance or support to officers seeking to obey the Fourth Amendment’s commands or to judges as they examine the validity of warrantless searches. Further, none of these tests are better than the King test
at targeting the risk of police exploitation. By tying the demands of the
test directly to the Fourth Amendment—rather than creating another
nebulous or restrictive standard—the Court chose the option
which best promulgates a relatively clear and concise statement of
permissible police behavior.
IV. THE KING STANDARD: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
Despite its critics, the King decision is commendable, both for its
consistency with past precedent and for its relatively clear guidance to
102
police and courts. Nevertheless, “the application of King in all cases

98

See The Supreme Court, 2010 Term, supra note 65, at 217-219 see also supra text accompanying notes 65-66 (summarizing this commentator’s criticism).
99
See The Supreme Court, 2010 Term, supra note 65, at 218.
100
Id. at 217.
101
See id. (outlining the multitude of factors the Court has considered in determining whether a warrantless entry was reasonable based on an alleged exigency).
102
See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Choosing the Rule for Police-Created Exigencies in Kentucky v.
King, SCOTUSBLOG (May 17, 2011, 7:52 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/05/
the-fourth-amendment-and-pragmatic-rulemaking/ (“[T]he Court’s method for choosing a rule is notable. The Court’s opinion tries to work through the various possible
tests to find a balanced and workable test to distinguish police-created from suspectcreated exigencies.”).
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103

isn’t entirely certain,” and the lower courts must now confront the
gaps in the doctrine. The test developed in King does not answer every
question raised by the police-created exigency doctrine, and it presents a challenge to law enforcement officials and those seeking to
protect personal privacy. Where police implicitly demand entry to a
home, the doctrine does not make clear whether a resulting exigency
would be police-created or not:
[I]magine the police come to a home, knock on the door, and say, “This
is the police! Open up!” The statement to “open up” is not a direct threat
— the police didn’t say, “open up or else we will do X” — but it is a form
of an order. A police order to take certain conduct may or may not count
as a “seizure” of the person who is commanded to take the step. The cases on that are actually quite unclear. . . . And even then, the seizure
doesn’t occur until the person actually complies with the order. . . . So
104
can the police yell to “open up”? It’s not clear.
105

This concern was raised prior to the Court’s ruling in King and
106
has served as a source of criticism since the decision. The Court appeared to consider this possibility at oral argument, but chose not to
107
use this case to resolve the issue. Owing to the subtleties involved in
determining whether police threatened the occupant in King, the
Court should have remanded the case for further proceedings on that

103

Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
105
See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Police-Created Exigent Circumstances in Kentucky v. King, SCOTUSBLOG ( Jan. 5, 2011, 1:44 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/01/policecreated-exigent-circumstances-in-kentucky-v-king/ (“[T]he officers [in King] didn’t just
knock and announce themselves: They knocked, announced their presence, and demanded to be let inside.”).
106
See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 34, at § 6.5 (“The chilling message of King thus
seems to be that threats to violate the Fourth Amendment are not verboten, at least if
made with a modicum of subtlety.”).
107
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011)
(No. 09-1272) (Alito, J.) (“[I]t might make a difference to me whether the police
demanded entry prior to the time when the alleged exigent circumstances arose. And
the only testimony on this point that I am aware of [is recorded in court documents]
when police banged on the door as loud as they could and announced ‘Police, police,
police.’”); id. at 44 (Sotomayor, J.) (“[T]here is something troubling about the police
attempting to coerce entry as opposed to requesting entry, but . . . it’s not clear from
this record which of the two the police did.”); id. at 53 (Scalia, J.)(“It wouldn’t technically be a Fourth Amendment violation, would it, if the police gave the impression that
they had a warrant and were about to kick in the door? Is that a Fourth Amendment
violation in and of itself?”).
104
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108

point. The Court found no evidence in the record of a demand by
the police amounting to a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment,
but stated that “if there is contradictory evidence [on that point] . . . ,
109
the state court may elect to address that matter on remand.”
Courts applying King have addressed the problem of explicit
110
threats, but they have not yet confronted implicit threats. In addition, “[w]hether a threat did or did not occur will depend upon the
exact words utilized by the police, and this is a matter likely to be a
111
matter of dispute in a great many cases.” As such, in the event that
an implicit demand case comes before the Court, it should take the
opportunity to resolve this issue. In doing so, the Court must be careful
not to undermine the clarity of the King rule. Until that day, lower
courts applying King must engage in the holistic, “totality of the circumstances” analysis required in exigent circumstances cases, and determine whether, on the facts of each case, a police officer’s actions
amount to an unconstitutional threat or demand to enter.
CONCLUSION
Despite the weaknesses in the doctrine and the plethora of criticisms levied at the decision, King sets forth a bright line rule in a
murky area of criminal law and is notable for its consistency with past
precedent. As long as lower courts are vigilant in applying the test and
in safeguarding citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights, King will protect the
sanctity of Americans’ homes while allowing law enforcement the freedom required to investigate violations of the law efficiently and effectively.

108

See Mannheimer, supra note 87 (arguing that the Court should have remanded
the case for a determination whether police demanded entry).
109
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1853 (2011).
110
See, e.g., United States v. Estrada, No. 1:11-CR-101 TS, 2012 WL 2367992, at *6
(D. Utah June 21, 2012) (“Here, the officers ‘threaten[ed] to engage in conduct that
violates the Fourth Amendment’ when they attempted to enter the [hotel] room with
the key card. Therefore, any destruction of evidence . . . was the result of police created
exigency and cannot be considered by the Court.” (first alteration in original) (quoting
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862)); People v. Cervantes, No. A131298, 2012 WL 2055106, at *6
(Cal. Ct. App. June 8, 2012) (“[W]e do not agree with appellant that Officer DeJesus’
statement, ‘open the door,’ as officers knocked and identified themselves, constituted a
threat to violate the Fourth Amendment.”); State v. Wood, No. COA10-372, 2011 WL
3891357, at *4 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2011) (unpublished table decision) (“They entered the room with the permission of one of its occupants, Ms. Mills, using her room
key. They did not threaten to enter without permission unless they were admitted.”).
111
LAFAVE, supra note 34, at § 6.5 (rev. 4th ed. Supp. 2011).
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